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Cooper v. Wallerstein

We need a more explicit trade-off analysis than is brought out by Cooper's monotonic, single curve. It is not just finding an intersection of 2 curves

For each category we need to estimate the net military advantage of a Soviet procurement (of 1... n items) vs the costs of our effort at denial:

cost of lost sales to US industry
" " enforcement: domestic opposition
" " political accomodations in multilateral agreement allies, neutrals ...

We would be helped by some common currency: how much could we rationally spend out of DoD budget to accomplish each denial.

We have to pay careful attention to the tradeoff for single/few items (hardest to enforce) versus a stream of them.

The costs of denial → ∞ for widely available technologies.

But it does not follow we should dispose of export restraints even there. There are quality and definitional problems in defining technologies as available. To retain leadership in the ECom process the US will have to lean over backwards; some of our political battles will be to try to persuade allies to share an economic disadvantage in order to salvage the margins.

There is little likelihood of a detailed analysis along these lines. Our institutional bias leads to "minimalist" conclusions similar to Cooper's and Bill Perry's. However, I am prepared to hear evidence to the contrary, namely that a huge list is enforceable at acceptable cost. Who will present that?

Jack.