If you have read a copy of this speech--written for a number of university audiences--you may want to participate in the proposed experiment. If you wish to do this, you are asked:

(a) to look into your heart and try to discover whether you, yourself, would want to participate in a political movement of the kind described, provided the objectives--as finally formulated--appealed to you and you thought that the movement could be effective.

(b) to show Dr. Szilard’s speech to people who might be interested and to determine who of these would be likely to form part of a dedicated minority that would give strong support to a movement of the kind described by Dr. Szilard.

(c) to write to Dr. Szilard, Hotel Dupont Plaza, Washington 6, D.C. as soon as possible telling him if you will support such a movement yourself, and advising him to how many people you have talked and how many of these and who of these (with names and addresses) you think could be counted upon.

You can get additional copies of this speech from: Michael or Barbara Brower, 3 Dana Street, Cambridge 38, Mass., Telephone Eliot 4-1371, at 25 cents each for 1-10 copies, plus 15 cents each for all additional copies.

About the Author of this Speech

The following note is taken from Dr. Szilard’s book, The Voice of the Dolphins. Containing five stories of political and social satire, this book was published in 1961 by Simon and Schuster in paper for $1.

"Dr. Leo Szilard was among the first to conceive of the possibility of an atomic chain reaction and to recognize what it would mean to the world. The first patent issued in America in the field of atomic energy was issued jointly in his name and the name of the late Enrico Fermi. With Professor E.P. Wigner he shared the Atoms for Peace Award for 1959.

"In 1939 Szilard took the initiative in inducing the U.S. Government to assume responsibility for the development of atomic energy. The historic letter which Albert Einstein wrote on August 2, 1939, to President Roosevelt was based on the work of Fermi and Szilard. In 1945 Szilard assumed the leadership of those of his colleagues who were opposed to dropping atomic bombs on the cities of Japan. In 1946 he led the successful fight of his colleagues against the May-Johnson Bill, which would have placed the development of atomic energy in the U.S. in the hands of an agency not under the direct "civilian" control of the President. At present Dr. Szilard is professor of biophysics at the University of Chicago."
"ARE WE ON THE ROAD TO WAR?"

by Leo Szilard

For a number of years now, you have had an opportunity to observe how we, as a nation, respond to the actions of the Russians, and how the Russians respond to our responses. Those of you who have watched closely the course of events, in the past six months, may have been led to conclude that we are headed for an all-out war. I myself believe that we are, and that our chances of getting through the next ten years, without war, are slim.

I, personally, find myself in rebellion against the fate that history seems to have in store for us, and I suspect that some of you may be equally rebellious. The question is, what can you do?

War seems indeed to be inevitable, unless it is possible somehow to alter the pattern of behavior which America and Russia are exhibiting at present. You, as Americans, are not in a position to influence the Russian government; it follows that you would have to bring about a change in the attitude of the American Government which, in turn, may bring about a similar change in the attitude of the Russian Government.

It is conceivable that if a dedicated minority were to take effective political action, they could bring about the change in attitude that is needed. But such a minority can take effective action only if it is possible to formulate a set of political objectives on which it may unite. I shall try to outline to you today such a set of political objectives.

Ever since the end of the war, the policies of the great powers have consistently followed the line of least resistance, and this line leads to an unlimited arms race. I do not believe that America can be made safe by keeping ahead in such an arms race.

There have been repeated attempts to stop the arms race by negotiating an agreement that would provide for some form of arms control. So far, all such attempts have failed, and each time they were followed by the continuation of the arms race, with renewed vigor.

Towards the end of the Eisenhower Administration, it was generally expected that the next administration would adopt a new approach to this problem and that a fresh attempt would be made to bring the arms race under control.

When Khrushchev was in New York a year ago last October, I tried to see him, in the hope of finding out how responsive he might be to such a new approach. I was told that they had scheduled fifteen minutes for me but, as it turned out, the conversation went on for two hours. At that time, it was not known whether Kennedy or Nixon would get elected, and I started off the conversation by saying that no matter who is elected, the Government would try to reach an understanding with Russia on the issue of stopping the arms race. Khrushchev answered--and he spoke in all seriousness--that he believed this also.
A year ago last November, I checked out of the hospital in New York, where I had been confined for over a year, took a taxi to the airport, and flew to Moscow to attend the 6th Pugwash Conference. I was accompanied by my wife, who is also my doctor, and I stayed on in Moscow for about a month beyond the end of the conference. I stayed on in Moscow in order to engage in private conversations with our Russian colleagues, because I knew from experience that only in private conversations is it possible to get anything across to them or to discover what they really believe to be true.

None of our Russian colleagues brought up the issue of bomb tests in any of these conversations in Moscow, even though two years earlier some of them had been passionately interested in this issue. I found, however, an undiminished interest in far-reaching disarmament which would result in substantial savings. On one occasion, I had tea with Fedorov, the General Secretary of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, with no one present except my interpreter. I had met Fedorov before and I always got along well with him. On this particular occasion, he spoke to me as follows:

"You must really believe me when I tell you that we want general disarmament. You have seen all this construction work going on in Moscow; it has been going on for many years; still we are not able to catch up with the housing shortage. If we had disarmament, we could not only solve this problem, but many of our other economic problems as well. Also, we could develop other nations on an unprecedented scale. So far, we are building only one hydro-electric dam in Africa—the Aswan Dam in Egypt; if we had disarmament, we could, and we would, build twenty such dams in Africa."

I tried to impress upon our Russian colleagues that the Kennedy Administration would make a serious effort to reach an understanding with Russia on the issue of arms control, but that the new Administration would need time—six months and more than six months, perhaps—to find its bearings on this issue and to get organized to deal with it.

When I returned to this country in February, I decided to stay in Washington for a while.

In Washington, my friends told me that the Government was going to make a sincere effort to reach an agreement with Russia on the cessation of bomb tests and that a reasonable proposal would be made to the Russians on this issue. They would have liked to hear from me that Russia would be likely to accept such a proposal, but coming fresh from Moscow, I had serious doubts on this score.

The invasion of Cuba took me by surprise. When I first heard about it, it was not clear, as yet, whether we were going to give air support to the invading Cuban exiles and whether we would, if necessary, send in the Marines also. My immediate reaction was that of alarm, for I believed that if we did any of these things, we would seriously risk war with Russia. I did not think that Russia would try to intervene in the Caribbean area, and I did not think that the Russians would launch long-range rockets aimed at our cities. I thought, however, that Russia might make some military move elsewhere, probably in the Middle East.

In retrospect, it would seem that I was wrong, for Tom Slick of San Antonio, Texas recently set forth, apparently on good authority, that, if America
had openly intervened in Cuba, at that point, Russia would have moved into West Berlin.

I would not venture to appraise just how close we came to an all-out war, on the occasion of the Cuban incident. I am reasonably certain, however, that if our intervention in Cuba had been successful, this would have blocked for many years to come any possibility of reaching an agreement on arms control with Russia. Failure to reach an accommodation on the Berlin issue might, of course, produce the same result.

I would not entirely exclude the possibility of war over Berlin, but to me it seems more probable that this crisis will be resolved by some uneasy compromise, and that it will not lead to an all-out war. Russia may bring pressure on West Berlin in order to promote any one of a number of her foreign policy objectives, but, on the larger issue, the issue of Germany, the true interest of America and Russia is the same. The true interest of both countries is to have Europe politically as stable as possible.

I am convinced that the Berlin issue could be satisfactorily resolved by negotiations, but this conviction is based on the belief that there is something that the Russians want that we should be willing to give them, and that there is something that we want that the Russians should be willing to give us in return.

There are many people who do not share this belief. They hold that the Berlin issue was artificially created by Russia for the purpose of humiliating America, for breaking up NATO, and for converting West Germany into a Communist state.

Many people, perhaps the majority, believe that the Russians are very much like the Nazis; that they have concrete plans for bringing about, one way or another, our total defeat in Europe, and also for subjugating the whole world to their rule.

Many people have a black and white picture of the world; they believe that the nations fall into two classes: the peace-loving nations, and those who are not peace-loving. America, France and England, and generally speaking our allies, including Germany and Japan, are peace-loving. Russia and China are not peace-loving nations. Twenty years ago, the situation was somewhat different; at that time, Russia was a peace-loving nation, but Germany and Japan were not.

Many people believe that ever since the atomic bomb forced the unconditional surrender of Japan, America has unceasingly tried to rid the world of the bomb, and that all her efforts were frustrated by Russian intransigence.

When I listen to people who hold such views, I sometimes have the feeling that I have lived through all this before and, in a sense, I have. I was sixteen years old when the first World War broke out, and I lived at that time in Hungary. From reading the Hungarian newspapers, it would have appeared that, whatever Austria and Germany did was right and whatever England, France, Russia, or America did was wrong. A good case could be made out for this general thesis in almost every single instance. It would have been quite difficult for me to prove, in any single instance, that the newspapers were wrong, but somehow, it seemed to me unlikely that the two nations located in the center of Europe should be invariably right, and that all the other nations should be invariably wrong. History, I reasoned, would hardly operate in such a peculiar fashion, and gradually I was led to conclusions which were diametrically opposed to the views held by the majority of my schoolmates.
Many of my schoolmates regarded me as something of an oracle because I was able to cope with the mysteries of lower arithmetic which baffled them, and one of them asked me one day quite early in the war who would lose the war. I said that I didn't know who would lose the war, but that I thought that I knew who ought to lose the war; I thought that Austria and Germany, as well as Russia, ought to lose the war. Since Austria and Germany fought on one side, and Russia on the other, it was not quite clear how this could happen. The fact is, of course, that it did happen.

I am not telling you this in order to impress you with how bright I am. Nobody at sixty can claim to be as bright as he was at sixteen, even though in most cases it is not the intelligence that deteriorates, but the character. The point I am trying to make is that even in times of war, you can see current events in their historical perspective, provided that your passion for the truth prevails over your bias in favor of your own nation.

After the First World War, when I lived in Berlin, a distinguished friend of mine, Michael Polanyi, asked me one day what I thought ought to be the rule of human conduct regulating the behavior of an individual in society. "Clearly," he said, "you cannot simply ask a man to be generous to other people, for if the other people are mean to him, and if he follows your rule, he may starve to death." "But," said Polanyi, "perhaps the rule ought to be 'Be one per cent more generous to people than they are to you.'" This should be sufficient, he thought, because if everyone were to follow this rule, the earth would, step by step, turn into a livable place.

I told him that, to my mind, this would not work at all, because if two people behave the same way toward each other, each is bound to think that he is 30 per cent more generous than the other. Clearly, the rule would have to allow for this bias. Perhaps if we were to stipulate, as the rule of conduct, "Be 31 per cent more generous to the others than they are to you," such a rule might work.

America and Russia are not following any such rule of conduct. Moreover, their bias greatly exceeds 30 per cent. Most Americans apply a yardstick to America's actions which is very different from the yardstick which they apply to Russia's actions. Whenever their bias in favor of their own nation gets into conflict with the truth, the odds are that the bias will prevail. As a result of this, they are not capable of seeing current events in their historical perspective. They may well realize that we are in trouble, but they cannot correctly diagnose the cause of the trouble, and, therefore, they are not in a position to indicate what the right remedy might be.

The people who have sufficient passion for the truth to give the truth a chance to prevail, if it runs counter to their bias, are in a minority. How important is this "minority?" It is difficult to say at this point, for, at the present time, their influence on governmental decisions is not perceptible.

If you stay in Washington, you may gain some insight into the manner in which important governmental decisions come about; you may get a feel of what kind of considerations enter into such decisions, and what kind of pressures are at work.

With President Kennedy, new men moved into the Administration. Many of them understand the implications of what is going on and are deeply concerned. But, they are so busy trying to keep the worst things from happening, on a day-to-day basis, that they have no time to develop a consensus on what the right approach would be, from the long-term point of view.
There are also a number of men in Congress, particularly in the Senate, who have insight into what is going on and who are deeply concerned, but mostly they lack the courage of their convictions. They may give a lucid analysis of the trouble in private conversations and then at some point or other, they will say: "Of course, I could not say this in public."

In Washington, wisdom has no chance to prevail at this point.

Last September, Life Magazine printed an article about me which said that I was in Washington trying to find out if there was a market for wisdom. Thereupon, I received a flood of letters from colleges and universities inviting me to give lectures. Most people get some pleasure out of hearing themselves talk, and so do I, yet I did not see much point in going around the country giving talks, if all I had to say was, that there was no market for wisdom. Therefore, I declined all these invitations; that is, I declined that all, until Brandeis University invited me to attend a Special Convocation and to receive an honorary doctor's degree. At that point, my vanity got the better of me, and I accepted. At Brandeis, I spoke at dinner informally to the Trustees and Fellows of the University, and this was my closest contact with the grass roots since I moved to Washington—if indeed, you may regard the Trustees and Fellows of Brandeis as grass roots.

I told them at Brandeis that I thought we were in very serious trouble; people asked me what there was that they could do about it, and I had no answer to give.

Is there, indeed, anything that these people—or for that matter I, myself, could do at this point that would make sense?

When I got back to Washington, I started to think about this, and I believe it will be best now if I simply recite to you how my thoughts developed from this point on.

The first thought that came to my mind was that—in cooperation with others—I could try to set up an organization in Washington—a sort of Lobby, if you will—which would bring to Washington, from time to time, scholars and scientists who see current events in their historical perspective. These men would speak with the sweet voice of reason, and our lobby could see to it that they would be heard by people inside of the Administration, and also by the key people in Congress.

The next thing that occurred to me was that these distinguished scholars and scientists would be heard, but that they might not be listened to, if they were not able to deliver votes.

Would they be listened to if they were able to deliver votes?

The minority for which they speak may represent just a few per cent of the votes, and a few per cent of the votes alone would not mean very much, just as the sweet voice of reason alone would not mean very much. Still, the combination of a few per cent of the votes and the sweet voice of reason might turn out to be an effective combination. And, if the minority for which these men speak, were sufficiently dedicated to stand ready not only to deliver votes, but also to make very substantial campaign contributions, then this minority would be in a position to set up the most powerful lobby that ever hit Washington.
The problem which the bomb poses to the world cannot be solved except by abolishing war, and nothing less will do. But first of all, we must back away from the war to which we have come dangerously close.

Could such a dedicated minority agree not only on the long-term political objectives which need to be pursued in order to abolish war, but also on the immediate political objectives, the objectives which must be pursued in the next couple of years, in order to make the present danger of war recede to the point where attention can be focused on the task of abolishing war?

America cannot be made secure by keeping ahead in an atomic arms race, and an agreement providing for arms control is a necessary first step towards abolishing war. An agreement on arms control does not seem to be, however, "around the corner." It might very well be, therefore, that in the immediate future America would have to take certain unilateral steps. Some of these steps would be taken in order to reduce the present danger of war; other steps would be taken so that if a war breaks out, which neither American nor Russia wants, it may be possible to bring hostilities to an end before there is an all-out atomic catastrophe.

Such unilateral steps are not adequate substitutes for negotiated agreements, and they can carry us only part of the way, but still there are some unilateral steps which can and should be taken at the present time. I propose to discuss with you at this point what these steps may be:

The issue of bomb tests and the issue of bomb shelters are peripheral issues: they are more the symptoms of the trouble we are in, than the cause of the trouble, and I propose to turn now to issues which I believe to be more important.

1.) Nothing is gained by America's winning meaningless battles in the cold war and a change of attitude in this regard is urgently needed. Take the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna, for instance. This organization has at present no function whatsoever, and if it is maintained in existence at all, it should be maintained as an exercise in cooperation among the nations.

The first director of this Agency was an American, and his term expired recently. Since, next to America, the Soviet Union is the most important atomic power, America could have proposed that the next director of the Agency be a Russian. Instead, America proposed a Swede, who was not acceptable to the Russians, and since America had the votes, she was able to win one more victory in a meaningless battle of the cold war.

All this "victory" did was to reduce the chances of finding some useful function for this Agency, because the Russians resent being pushed around in this Agency, and there is no way for us to force them to play ball.

I believe that it would be important for the Government to reach a major policy decision, and for the President to issue an Executive Order against fighting meaningless battles in the cold war.

We have a cultural exchange program with the Russians but their State Department and our State Department are playing a game of "if you hit our scientists, we shall hit your scientists." Accordingly, our State Department imposes senseless travel restrictions on our Russian colleagues who visit this country.
These travel restrictions are not aimed at the safeguarding of any secrets, but are merely one way of hitting back at travel restrictions which the Soviet Government occasionally imposes on American scientists who travel about in Russia.

I believe that representations ought to be made, at as high a level of the Administration as is necessary, for the Secretary of State to find some other assignment in the State Department for those who have, up till now, handled the East-West Cultural Exchange Program.

2.) I believe that America could and should make two crucially important policy decisions and that she should proclaim these decisions.

First of all, America should resolve and proclaim that she would not resort to any strategic bombing of cities or bases of Russia (either by means of atomic bombs or conventional explosives), except if American cities or bases are attacked with bombs, or if there is an unprovoked attack with bombs against one of America's allies.

Further, America should make a second policy decision and should proclaim this decision. In order to understand the meaning and relevance of this second decision, it is necessary to consider the following:

Soon after the war, when Russia did not as yet have any atomic bombs, she proposed that the bomb be outlawed. This could take the form of a unilateral pledge, given by each atomic power, that it would not resort to the use of atomic bombs either for the purpose of attacking cities or bases or as a tactical weapon to be used against troops in combat.

Recently Sulzberger of the New York Times discussed with Khrushchev the possibility of such unilateral pledges renouncing the use of the bomb. Khrushchev said on this occasion that if there were a war, even if at first only conventional weapons were used, subsequently the side which is about to lose the war would find it impossible to abide by its pledge and would resort to the use of the bomb.

This brings out what I believe to be the crux of the issue, that today it might still be possible to resist force with force, but the objective of the use of force must no longer be victory. The objective can only be to make a conquest difficult and unpalatable by making it painful and expensive. If force is used then, an all-out war which neither side wants can be avoided only if both sides recognize that the use of force must not be aimed at victory, or anything approaching victory.

Keeping this point of view in mind, America could and should adopt the policy that if, in case of war, she were to use atomic bombs against troops in combat, she would do so only on our own side of the pre-war boundary.

America would then be bound by a pledge to this effect in case of war, as long as Russia imposes a similar restraint on her conduct of the war.

Manifestly, this type of use of atomic bombs would be a defensive operation and moreover, it would be a very effective defensive operation, either on the part of Russia or on the part of America, as long as the restraints remain in effect on both sides.

Such a pledge would be no less clear than the simple pledge renouncing
the use of the bomb, but it would be much easier to keep and therefore it would be a more believable pledge. And if neither side aims at anything approaching victory, then it would greatly reduce the danger of an all-out war.

When I discussed this issue in Germany three years ago, the people there said that if the ground forces of the allies were pushed back to the Rhine, and America used atomic bombs against troops in combat between the Rhine and the Oder Neisse line, many West German cities might be destroyed by American bombs. I do not know to what extent West German cities could be spared by a judicious tactical use of atomic bombs by American forces, but I do know that if America were to use bombs beyond the pre-war boundary, West German cities would be destroyed by Russian bombs.

Recently, the United Nations Assembly voted with a more than two-thirds majority, 55 against 20, to outlaw the use of atomic bombs in war. The use of atomic bombs in warfare was declared by the Assembly to be a crime and a violation of the United Nations Charter.

Since the machinery of the United Nations was set up for the purpose of maintaining peace among the smaller nations, assuming the cooperation of the great powers to this end, attempts to regard a two-thirds vote of the Assembly as legally binding must necessarily fail. Still, the United States must not fly in the face of world opinion and simply disregard the vote of the General Assembly, when a two-thirds vote of the Assembly expresses the legitimate concern of a great majority of the nations that the use of atomic bombs in warfare might lead to a world catastrophe. Rather, out of respect for world opinion and in its own interest, the United States ought to go as far towards complying with it as valid considerations for its own security permit. The restrictions on the use of atomic bombs in case of war which I am advocating are advocated with this end in view.

Western Europe is not inferior to Russia either in manpower or in resources and it would be possible for Western Europe to build up within five years conventional forces to the point where it could completely renounce the use of atomic bombs against troops in combat in case of war. But even this would be to no avail unless the nations involved give up any thought of fighting limited wars for "limited objectives," and use force only to make a conquest difficult and, with luck, to prevent it.

As long as there is no agreement providing for arms control, and Russia remains in possession of large stockpiles of bombs, America has no choice but to maintain a strategic atomic striking force. However, we should maintain such a force only as protection against America or her allies being attacked with bombs or missiles. The number of bombs retained for this purpose need not be very large, and more important than the number of bombs retained is the invulnerability of the bases from which they would be launched. If these bases are invulnerable, so that no single massive attack against them could substantially damage America's ability to retaliate, then America needs to retain only enough bombs to be able to destroy, in retaliation, a substantial number of Russia's cities, after giving due notice to permit their orderly evacuation.

It must be made clear, however, that if America adopts the policy here advocated, she thereby renounces the threat of strategic bombing as a general deterrent because she could then make this threat only in case Russia would drop atomic bombs, and drop them on our side of the pre-war boundary.

I, personally, do not believe that America would lose much by giving up the threat of strategic bombing because the deterrent effect of such a threat is negligible unless the threat is believable.
If America were to threaten to drop bombs, in case of war, on a large number of Russian cities, knowing full well that Russia would retaliate by dropping bombs on a large number of American cities, such a threat would be tantamount to a threat of Murder and Suicide. The threat of murder and suicide would not be a believable threat, in the context of the so-called Berlin Crisis, nor would it be a believable threat in the context of any other similar conflict in which America's rights and interests may be at stake, but not America's existence as a nation.

Those responsible for the planning of strategy in the Department of Defense would concede this much. According to persistent press reports there is, however, an increasingly influential school of thought in the Department of Defense which holds that in case of war with Russia, America may engage in strategic bombing, aimed at the destruction of Russian rocket bases and strategic air bases. America would not bomb any of Russia's cities if she can help it, as long as Russia did not bomb any of America's cities.

This school of thought holds that, at present, Russia does not have many long-range rocket bases and strategic air bases, that the location of many of those bases is known, and that most of them are vulnerable so that they could be destroyed by attacking them with bombs. By building enough long-range solid-fuel rockets (Minutemen) and submarines capable of launching intermediate-range solid-fuel rockets (Polaris), America may be able to keep ahead in this game for the next five years. By that time Europe should build up conventional forces to the level where it may be possible for the West to forego the use of atomic bombs.

Those who advocate such a policy believe that if America should succeed in knocking out, say, 90% of Russia's strategic atomic striking forces, then the Russians may speak to us as follows, "We have enough rockets left to destroy a large number of American cities, but we know that if we did this America might retaliate by destroying all of our cities. Therefore, we are going to hold our fire and we propose to negotiate peace. We concede that the power balance has now shifted in America's favor and we are now willing to yield on a number of issues on which we took an inflexible stand prior to the outbreak of hostilities." If this were to happen America would have won a victory even though it may be a victory in a limited sense of the term only.

In technical language this kind of a policy is called, "counterforce strategy" and it is my contention that the adoption of this strategy would have disastrous consequences.

As long as war is not abolished and force may be resisted with force it will be necessary to consider both the means that may be employed and the aims which may be pursued. Whether only conventional weapons are used, or whether atomic bombs are used also, may be an important question, but far more important is the issue of whether force is resorted to in order to discourage conquest by exacting a price, if necessary a very high price, or whether the aim is victory. I do not believe that in a conflict between America and Russia it would be possible to avoid an all-out atomic catastrophe if there were a resort to force and if the aim were to settle controversial issues in our favor through victory or something approaching victory.

Naturally, if there is a war and America resorts to the bombing of bases in Russia, one could not expect the Russians to sit idly by and watch America picking up step by step one base after another. It follows that America would have to start the strategic bombing of Russian bases with a sudden, massive attack.
and to try to destroy all vulnerable Russian bases of known location in the first attack. Accordingly, a counterforce policy is of necessity, a "first strike against bases--in case of war" policy.

There are, of course, people in the Department of Defense who have serious doubts that America would actually adopt such a strategy in case of war, yet they believe that--at the present juncture--it is a good thing to threaten to bomb Russian bases in case of war because, this is a more believable threat than the threat of "murder and suicide."

I do not know just how believable this threat is, but I do know that at best we are purchasing an increased restraint on Russia's part, for a year or two, and that we are purchasing it at a very high price. For whether we adopt a counterforce strategy or merely give Russia the impression that we have adopted such a strategy, we are provoking an all-out atomic arms race and may within a very few years reach the point of no return in this regard.

I believe that it is imperative to oppose: (a) the adoption of plans which provide for the bombing of Russian rocket and strategic air bases in case of war, and (b) the adoption of the policy of "deterring" Russia with the threat that America would resort to this kind of strategic bombing in case of war.

I believe that the rejection of both these policies is an attainable political objective because there is sufficient doubt inside the Administration about their wisdom.

3.) America could and should resolve that atomic bombs and the means suitable for their delivery which are supplied by her and which are stationed in Europe, shall remain in the hands of American military units which are under American command, rather than be placed under the control of NATO. As long as America is committed to defend Western Europe, there is no valid argument for turning over bombs to the control of other Western European nations.

Germany is going to put increasingly strong pressure on the United States Government to turn over such equipment to NATO control, and I would be in favor of balancing any such pressure by bringing domestic political counter-pressure to bear on the Government.

America should stand firm in opposing the production of atomic and hydrogen bombs by Germany as well as means suitable for their delivery. It is conceivable, of course, that all attempts to achieve arms control may fail and that in the end it will not be within the power of the United States to prevent Germany from producing its own bombs and rockets. At about the same time the United States may, however, also free herself from her commitment to defend Germany against external military intervention. But our concern here is primarily with the present and not with developments that may conceivably occur in the unpredictable future.

4.) Not every issue can be solved by Congress passing a law, and there are borderline issues where political action alone can bring no solution because the specific knowledge is lacking of how to go about the solution. The issue of general disarmament seems to be such a borderline issue.

I believe that, at the present time, little could be gained by bringing pressure on the Administration to enter into formal negotiations with Russia on the issue of General Disarmament, because--as they say, "You can lead a horse to the water, but you can't make him drink."

I believe that no substantial progress can be made towards disarmament until Americans and Russians first reach a meeting of the minds of the issue of how the peace may be secured in a disarmed world.
American reluctance to seriously contemplate general disarmament is largely due to uncertainty about this point. If it became clear that a satisfactory solution of this issue is possible, many Americans may come to regard general disarmament as a highly desirable goal.

On the issue of how to secure the peace in a disarmed world, progress could probably be made reasonably fast, through non-governmental discussions among Americans and Russians. I believe that such discussions ought to be arranged through private initiative, but with the blessing of the Administration.

It remains to be seen whether the newly created Agency for Arms Control and Disarmament will be in a position to mobilize the imagination and resourcefulness which is required and whether it may be necessary for a major private group to help them out or to prod them along--as the case may be.

The Russians know very well that America is not ready seriously to contemplate general disarmament and this, to my mind, explains why, in spite of being strongly motivated for disarmament, the Russian Government displays in its negotiations on this issue much the same attitude as does the American Government. As far as negotiations on disarmament are concerned, hitherto both governments have been mainly guided by the public relations aspect rather than by the substantive aspect of the issue.

The Soviet Union's attitude might change overnight, however, if it became apparent that America was becoming seriously interested in disarmament.

The Russians are very much aware of the great economic benefits they would derive from disarmament, and I believe that the Soviet Union would be willing to pay a commensurate price for obtaining it. It stands to reason that this should be so, for the Soviet Union spends on defense an even larger fraction of her industrial output than America does.

America is at present committed to protect certain territories which are located in the geographical proximity of Russia. In the case of general disarmament, America would not be able to live up to such commitments. Disarmament will therefore be politically acceptable to America only if it is possible for her to liquidate most of her present commitments--without too much loss of prestige and without seriously endangering the interest of the other nations involved.

Khrushchev seems to be very much aware of this. Therefore, it is quite possible that if it came to serious negotiations on the issue of disarmament, and if it became manifestly necessary to reach a political settlement in order to permit America to liquidate her military commitments, then the Soviet Union would go a long way towards seeking an accommodation.

The so-called Berlin Crisis, which centers around the commitments which America made to West Berlin, might very well be a case in point.

5.) General disarmament will, if we are lucky, eliminate war, but it will not end the rivalry between America and Russia.

It is a foregone conclusion that American efforts towards creating an orderly and livable world will be frustrated in Southeast Asia and Africa because of our failure to devise forms of democracy which would be viable in these regions of the world. The task of devising forms of democracy which would be suitable to the needs of such areas is not a task that the Government can handle. Various forms of democracy may have to be devised which are tailor-made to fit the various areas. A major private group could tackle and ought to tackle this problem. If it is not solved more and more under-developed nations will become dictatorships;
some of them may have a rapid succession of dictator after dictator and, in the end, the people may have to choose between Chaos and Communism.

It is also a foregone conclusion that America's efforts to raise the standard of living of under-developed nations may be frustrated in those areas where the birth rate is high, infant mortality is high, and there is little arable land left. Improvement in the standard of living will initially lead to a fall in infant mortality, and if the birth rate remains high, the population will shoot up so rapidly that economic improvements will not be able to catch up.

Our failure to develop methods of birth control, suitable for the needs of such areas, is responsible for this state of affairs. The development of such methods is not a task which the Government can undertake. The Government could not create research institutes which would attract scientists who are ingenious and resourceful enough to come up with an adequate solution. A major private group could and should tackle this problem.

If it should turn out that it is possible to formulate a set of political objectives on which reasonable people could generally agree, and if these objectives could count on the all-out support of a sizable, dedicated minority--then I should be impelled to go further, and I would plan to do so along the following lines:

I would ask about fifteen distinguished scientists to serve as Fellows of a Council which might be called Council for Abolishing War or perhaps Council for a Livable World. The Fellows (who would all be scientists) would elect the Board of Directors of the Council, but membership on the Board of Directors would not be restricted to scientists.

This Council would, first of all, assemble a panel of political advisors, whose identity would be public knowledge, and in close consultation with these advisors, it would formulate two sets of objectives. To the first set belong those objectives which cannot be attained at the present time through political action because it would take further inquiry, and perhaps even real research to know, in concrete terms, what needs to be done. To the second set belong those objectives which can be pursued through political action because it is clear what needs to be done.

The Fellows of the Council would set up a research organization aimed at the pursuit of the first set of objectives and they would elect the Trustees of that organization. The Fellows of the Council would also set up a political organization aimed at the pursuit of the second set of objectives, and they would elect the Board of Directors of that organization. Membership on the Board would not be restricted to scientists. Because one of the major functions of the second organization would be to lobby, we may refer to it for our purposes tonight as the Lobby.

The Lobby would hold hearings, perhaps once every four months, and would subsequently proclaim in detail the immediate political objectives it proposes to support. It would communicate these objectives, perhaps in the form of a series of pamphlets, to all those who are believed to be seriously interested. Those who regularly receive the communications of the Lobby would be regarded as members of the Movement, if they are willing actively to support at least one of the several specific objectives proclaimed by the Lobby.

It seems to me that there is no need to enlist those who are interested as members of an organization. What one needs to create is not a membership organization, but a Movement.
The articulate members of the Movement would be expected to discuss the relevant issues with editors of their newspapers and various columnists and other opinion makers in their own community. They would be expected to write to, and in other ways keep in touch with, their Congressman and the two Senators of their own State.

One of the functions of the Lobby would be to help the members of the Movement clarify their own minds on the political objectives they wish actively to support and to help arrange appointments for those members who come to Washington to see Congressmen, Senators and certain key members of the Administration.

The members of the Movement would be regarded as pledged to vote in the primaries as well as in the elections. As far as federal elections are concerned, they would be pledged to cast their vote, disregarding domestic issues, solely on the issue of war and peace.

Further, the members of the Movement would be regarded as pledged annually to spend 2% of their income on campaign contributions. The members would be asked to make out a check payable to the recipient of the campaign contribution but to mail that check to the Washington office of the Lobby for transmission. In this manner the Lobby would be in a position to keep track of the flow of campaign contributions and to maintain a more effective contact with the recipients of these contributions.

Those in high income brackets may be left free to contribute 3% after taxes rather than 2% before taxes. There would be a provision for student members of the Movement that would permit them to spend a lesser amount on campaign contributions than adult members. All members of the Movement would be free to wear an emblem that would identify them as members of the Movement if they wish to do so.

Those who wish to support the Movement but do not want to go so far as making political contributions in the amount of 2% of their income, may regard themselves as supporters of the Movement if they spend either 1% of their income on political contributions or $100 per year, according to their own preferences. Such supporters of the Movement may expect to receive the advice and guidance of the Lobby and may make use of the services rendered by the Lobby on the same terms as the members of the Movement.

So that each member of the Movement may know where his contribution should go, in order to be most effective in furthering the political objectives which he has chosen to pursue, the Lobby would keep in touch with each member. The Lobby would keep the members informed about the particular contests for seats in Congress which are of interest to the Movement; it may advise one member to take an interest in one of these contests and another member to take an interest in another of these contests.

This does not mean the Lobby would explicitly endorse anyone running for office. It may be assumed that if the importance of a given contest is brought to the attention of a member, the member will have no difficulty figuring out for himself which of the two candidates for office he ought to support.

For covering the operating expenses of the Lobby and the Research Organization (which would be maintained independently and operated parallel to the Lobby), one would look to the members of the Movement. Each year a certain group of the members would be asked by the Board of the Lobby or the Trustees of the Research Organization to contribute 2 per cent of their income to them, rather than to spend it for political contributions. One year this group might be composed of those whose names start with the letter "C." Another year it might be composed of those whose names start with the letter "R," etc.

The influence of the Movement would be greatly enhanced if the Lobby were able to say not only how many votes it represents, in toto, but also how many
votes it represents in each state and in each congressional district. So that the Lobby may not make false representations concerning the votes it may be able to deliver, the Board would from time to time ask all those who regularly receive its communications, to say which of the political objectives proclaimed by the Board they propose to support and if they intend to perform with respect to those objectives as members of the Movement are expected to perform.

The Movement must not wield the power that it may possess crudely. People in Washington want to be convinced, they do not want to be bribed or blackmailed. He who gives consistently financial support to certain key members of Congress may evoke their lasting friendship and may count on their willingness to listen to him as long as he talks sense. He who talks to members of Congress, but does not talk sense, will not accomplish anything of lasting value, even if he temporarily sweeps some members of Congress off their feet by making huge political contributions to them.

There are many intelligent men in Congress who have insight into what goes on; the Movement could help these men to have the courage of their convictions. There are others in Congress who are not capable of such insight; the only thing to do with them is not to return them to Congress, and to replace them with better men. This may make it necessary to persuade better men to run in the primaries and to stand for election. To find such better men must be one of the tasks of the Movement, and the Lobby must be prepared to help the members of the Movement to perform this task.

As I said at the outset, I did not come here to enlist any of you in such a Movement or to launch such a Movement. I came here to invite you to participate in an experiment that ought to show whether such a movement could be successfully launched.

First of all, I ask each of you to look into your own heart and try to discover whether you yourself would want to participate in a political movement of the kind described, provided the objectives—as formulated from time to time—appealed to you and you thought that the Movement could be effective.

Those of you who wish to participate in the experiment are asked to show a copy of this speech to people who might be interested and to determine who of these would be likely to be part of a dedicated minority that would give all-out support to a movement of the kind I have described.

I would appreciate your writing me, as soon as possible, how many people you have talked to, and how many of these and who of these (name and address), you think could be counted upon.

As soon as the result of this experiment, and other experiments of a similar nature, indicate that such a Movement could get off the ground, provided it were started in the right way and on a sufficiently large scale, then the Council for Abolishing War would be constituted. Presumably the Council would attempt to identify 25,000 to 50,000 individuals who would be willing to make campaign contributions in the amount of 2% of their income as long as they approved of the political objectives advocated by the Council and as long as they thought the Movement would be effective. Presumably, if the Council is successful in this, the Fellows of the Council would proceed to establish the Lobby.

By the time the Movement attains 200,000 members it would represent about $20 million per year in campaign contributions or $80 million over a four year period. Whether such a Movement could grow further and come to represent not only a significant amount in campaign contributions but also a significant number of votes, would then presumably depend on the future course of world events.