Bill Perry has already written the book: his paper in Foreign Affairs.

Some addendums:

- Do we need (so few?) huge resources? Smart weapons can do their job with much smaller payloads, fewer units. We don't have every weapon to go around. Wouldn't we be less (more) smaller units? Perhaps less elaborately defended.

- Reciprocally, our high value targets are perfect seek. Very small personnel in ships may be too dangerous. Even with smart weapons, they're a minor part of the logistic load.

There is also a revolution in 1) affordability and 2) the lead and character of the manifest threats I and hence the passive force and lead that our electorate will be willing to support.

If there is to be an organization to help think this through, I'd suggest an analogue to the CNO's executive, specifically some smart O-6s and a civilian advisory panel, perhaps some outside contracting, but attached to the Chairman of the JCS. The DSB does not (still) too close to existing.

[Handwritten notes and diagrams]
best suited. DSB could take on some special sub-study.

The proliferation of access and use of WMD's will certainly complicate the environment. We will see the paper counter-revenge for HTSW's. Some analogy about what has deterred or deflected their use in the past is certainly worth which. More formally, what is the role of deterrence in the effective, how build the international consensus to make deterrence still more effective? I am just completely concerned with optimizes regulations in this realm.

I don't need to add anything to "information even". But not enough is said about deception and counter deception. That includes providing attacks on sensitive facilities. Many examples in Iraq.

I've been party to many studies of technological surprise. That always wakes our heads. But all concerned that novel advanced use of existing technology was a more likely source of surprise than new physics. The latter can happen but there probably would be substantial delay before military application.