aspect

JERUSALEM. The most startling aspect of Israel, on the surface, is the appearance of normality. The streets, bazaars, shops and hotels on both sides of the obliterated boundary here are crowded with an improbable mixture of Western tourists and businessmen, orthodox Jews in fur hats and kaftans, Arab shopkeepers in kaffiya and robe. This city, like all of Palestine has never been more peaceful. A routine pass will allow anyone to travel freely throughout the new Israeli "empire". The tourists in Tel Aviv include many Arabs from cis-Jordan, Gaza, Nablus exploiting their new found opportunity to visit the metropolis.

I find myself in Israel to visit the Weizmann Institute, a world-renowned center of pure science, located at Rehovoth, near Tel Aviv. But my friends there conspire to give me the opportunity to see some of the more important signs of historic events.

The Institute's program of scientific research matches that of
any major American university in its orientation to fundamental issues of human knowledge, and its distance from the problems of daily life and survival in the Middle East. The Government makes only incidental use of its scientists for national programs, but they are nevertheless in close touch with political and military leaders at an intellectual level not easy to define.

My most interesting interview so far was a couple of hours with General Uzi Narkiss, the commander of the central zone, "captor of Jerusalem", and now immediately responsible for the occupation of the "West Bank", Arab Palestine. It does not take many hours to tour this empire, and I had already had the opportunity to spend an afternoon with the Arab mayor of one of its towns, an area I had not expected to find as prosperous as it was, dotted with carefully built stone houses.

The normality is a fruit of the shrewdest policy laid down by General Moshe Dayan. The indigenous Arab population had taken no
maintained only a nominal relationship to the Royal Jordanian Government, which did not go so far as to pay taxes regularly.

By leaving the local economy intact, it would be easiest to transfer suzerainty from Amman to Jerusalem. Thanks to its convertibility in London, the Jordanian dinar can remain the local currency, exchangeable even in Tel Aviv for Israeli pounds.

A thriving commerce of produce, but not of people, crosses the Jordan at its intersection with the modern Jerusalem-Amman highway. But this read, easily accessible for an afternoon picnic in the Judean hills is also still marked with the burned-out tanks from the war.

Under the surface, one senses a revolution in the thinking of many Israelis. It can be signified by the jocular references to the Israeli Empire, a phrase that conveys imperial responsibility and glory to most Jews here. During the last
nineteen years, survival was the keynote. This had to take precedence over the problems of the Arab refugees and the Arab minority in Israel. Egypt and Jordan were certainly doing their utmost not to solve these problems either.

Now, survival is an imperial question -- a joke of a question at one level, in view of the postage-stamp sized areas in question, but no joke for the military security of Israel, nor for the million inhabitants. This is a very different concept from that of the Jewish national state, and it will take some time to cross the bridge.

The most heartening sign is a very widespread attitude that the question of the development of Arab life is a human question that must be met in humanitarian terms, independently of any political settlement that may be negotiated with Egypt and Syria. There is no evidence that these powers have any real interest in sharing their resources with the Arabs of Palestine, and these people are fed up with being pawns in the power struggle. The Israeli government has, however, still to make a formal decision on these delicate problems.

To wait for tempers to cool seems to be the dominant policy, and it is a wise one so far. However, normal political life even at a local level is probably impossible until there can be some formal commitments about the future of the occupied territories. Many Arab leaders would like nothing better than independence from Amman, not to mention Damascus, Cairo and Moscow; but they dare
not cooperate too constructively so long as there is any chance of a forced return to Hussein's rule. So the schools are still closed in Hebron, and the Israeli occupiers do not force the issue; all sides are just waiting.

The most interesting proposals, discussed sympathetically by some Arabs and Israelis, are for a federation of three states: Israel, Arab Palestine, and Jerusalem. Over a period of five to ten years, there would be a gradual equalibration of economic standards and political democracy that could lead to a compromise like Switzerland's. If Syria and Egypt continue their pattern of exploitation of their own depressed classes, there will be little incentive for Arab union, and the possibility of parity among all the states of the federation in foreign and military responsibilities as well as domestic.

Jerusalem remains one of the main sticking points, and some clever compromise is badly needed here. One of the most capital plausible is for its incorporation as a special federal/district like Mexico, Canberra or Washington, D.C.