COURSE OUTLINE FOR ARMS CONTROL COURSE

Winter Quarter 1971

Note: We would propose to have a fairly complete schedule for lectures for the Winter Quarter. It will be necessary in order to have some interaction with the students to allow time in each lecture for discussion and perhaps to have a discussion section each week with one or two of the faculty. We would also suggest that we should consider any outline as flexible and be prepared to change the outline as the course itself dictates.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Meeting</th>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Lecturer*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Introduction to Arms Control</td>
<td>Lewis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Historical attempts in the control of interstate conflict</td>
<td>Paret</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>The state and interstate relations as focused on arms</td>
<td>North</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Science, politics and diplomacy</td>
<td>Panofsky</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Approaches to arms and diplomacy: Western experience</td>
<td>Craig</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Approaches to arms and diplomacy: Communist experience</td>
<td>Lewis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>The evolution of Cold War strategies</td>
<td>Paret</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Outline of American post-war strategies</td>
<td>Lewis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Disarmament negotiations in post-war U.S.-Soviet relations: II</td>
<td>Barton</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Disarmament negotiations in post-war U.S.-Soviet relations: III</td>
<td>Panofsky</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Disarmament negotiations in post-war U.S.-Soviet relations: IV</td>
<td>Ehrlich/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>An evaluation of the post-war developments through the fifties</td>
<td>Panofsky</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>Exam</td>
<td>Bernstein</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
III. Contemporary Problems in Arms Control

15. Deterrence and arms control
16. Contemporary problems in testing and detection (ABM, MIRV, etc.)
17. Recent proposals for the control of nuclear weapons: I
18. Recent proposals for the control of nuclear weapons: II
19. Positive aspects of control: the peaceful uses of nuclear energy

IV. Emergent Issues and Approaches

20. Presidential control of force and crisis management
21. Emergent issues in arms control: ideology and rigidities in state behavior
22. Emergent issues in arms control: new forms of warfare
23. Emergent issues in arms control: chemical and biological weapons
24. Emergent issues in arms control: a comparison of special U.S. and Soviet domestic problems
25. American approaches to strategic arms limitations
26. An evaluation of arms control in the sixties
27. Exam

V. Institutions for the Control of Arms

28. International institutions for the control of arms: UN
29. U.S. institutions for developing negotiating positions
30. U.S. institutions for the control of arms
31. Forms of agreement
32. Informal institutions for the control of arms and the role of scientists
33. Historical considerations in the organization for the control of arms: an overview
VI. Models and Theories for Arms Control

34. The place of models in the analysis of arms control
North

35. The place of models in the analysis of arms control
North

36. U.S. theories of arms control for the seventies
Lewis

37. Non-American theories of arms control: Soviet
Triska

38. Non-American theories of arms control: Chinese
Lewis

39. Non-American theories of arms control: European
Lewis

VII. Conclusion of First Quarter

40. General evaluation of arms control and disarmament
Staff

Final exam

*Note: The following is a breakdown on the number of lectures per faculty member.

Barton 7
Bernstein 1
Craig 3
Ehrlich 3
George 1
Lederburg 1
Lewis 8
North 4
Panofsky 8
Paret 3
Peterson 1
Triska 1
Staff 1