Dear Mr. Neild:

Thank you for your letter of April 15.

I should have been more precise, and in the future will attempt to be, in defining what I meant by proposing a "chemical non-proliferation treaty." Basically I was trying to carve out segments of potential mischief that nevertheless were not too severely complicated by problems of verification. The mischief I had in mind was the dissemination of CW capability from capable to other powers, i.e. a chemical arms trade. Apart from the strategic and political implications of such dissemination, it also constitutes a technique of operational testing that would then focus irresistible interest in such weaponry. Consider Spain in 1936 with reference to tactical air power!

The other aspect of proliferation, the independent development CW capability by countries which do not now have it, would be subject to the same uncertainties of verification that would apply to a general CW ban. I agree that there would be little merit in seeking that kind of step.

Even with respect to non-dissemination I agree that this is unlikely to be developed in response to any unilateral suggestions from the larger powers.

On pages 107 to 108 distinguish the interest in verification on the part of nuclear and smaller powers. This may be the focus of any important disagreement in our points of view. The U.S. is involved (in contrast to Sweden's independent line) in circum-global security arrangements. The needs of the U.S. as a nuclear power and of others allied to it are not so readily distinguished. Of course I cannot insist on my speculations about possible future courses of nuclear politics. The progressive encapsulation of nuclear power is one of several possibilities -- perhaps one of the most optimistic. But we clearly have emerged a considerable distance away from the doctrine of massive retaliation upon which your own reasoning evidently relies.

All of the factors indicated at 2A of your letter are pertinent to the potential outcome. Many people have argued for removal of U.S. troops from Europe and reliance instead on airlift for prompt response in support of European defense. The possibility of such developments is related to the confidence that a one or two day delay will not be critical. Thus the evolution of NATO may be profoundly influenced by the credibility of a unilateral Soviet chemical threat. This in turn would have important reverberations for a long-term development of independent...
German military capability. Unverifiable chemical disarmament may then end up giving us less rather than greater stability.

What I meant by a "loose" CW agreement was one along the lines of the Soviet block proposals during the last two years. On the other hand, no approach seems more promising than one based on "inspection by challenge" or what might be called negotiated verification. However, this may require a flexibility of approach beyond what can be accomplished in a straight forward way by a formal treaty. Perhaps we could make strong headway in that direction by negotiating a non-dissemination treaty that also included provisions for setting up elective machinery leading to "inspection by challenge" by informal agreement.

You ask about applying these principles to BW. Nothing in this area can be regarded as entirely reassuring or satisfactory! However, BW not yet having been tested to any significant degree its military utility is far more dubious and there is correspondingly less incentive to risk a clandestine development. Also, for obvious reasons it will be more difficult to test BW, at least that directed against man, in any very realistic way. In contrast to CW and other weapons it is not feasible to make simple physical extrapolations on the efficacy of a BW from measurements in test situations or on experimental animals. However, the main justification for the separate BW treaty is that it is the best that can be negotiated, that it is subject to a certain kind of inspection via the international health community, and that it may lay the basis for more congenial mutual confidence in this field in the future. But I believe most of these arguments have been developed and amplified by your own group.

My remark about a loose agreement making it difficult to accomplish a meaningful one means simply this: if the Soviet Union had been able to secure an unverified ban they would have had an unilateral advantage (in practice) from which they would be most unlikely to retreat in the future. I do not suggest that they would intend to proceed with clandestine violations. But, given the facts of their social system, they could look forward to a freedom of action that is not available to the democratic countries.

I am surprised that you have received little feedback from your publications. They have already had a considerable influence and this will increase when they are definitively published. They have been quoted often in the Proceedings of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and they cannot but have had an important influence on the thinking of the diplomats there.

One of my most urgent concerns is that CW may be adopted by guerrilla groups, in this country and elsewhere, as more and more attention is given to them. This merely leads me to suggest some discretion in the advertisement of technical details, for example about nerve gas or some biologicals, except where this is really pertinent to the political discussion. In particular, while one cannot avoid a discussion of the binary concept, I would certainly hesitate to broadcast enough detail about it to encourage an amateur to try his hand at making a safe home-made weapon. Needless to say this is also a very strong argument against the escalation of military experiments in this field!

Sincerely yours,

Joshua Lederberg
Professor of Genetics

JL:k