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Dear Dr. Scoville

Thank you for sending me the material on CW. I was quite willing to focus rather narrowly on BW, as a biologist at the CCD, but cannot avoid having some thoughts on CW also. On the whole, I accept the reasoning in your papers, which is, I believe very similar to Han Swyter's arguments at the Zablocki subcommittee.

I do think the obvious-delineation argument may cut both ways. Yes, "No Gas, Period." if that works. But I would not want to see marginal breaches of that doctrine, if they should happen, then ~~be~~ used to justify ~~any~~ unlimited use of lethal gases in retaliation. Or BW.

Also, the lines are inevitably much fuzzier when we consider stockpiling, development, etc. whereas I think we can identify certain categories of agents which are likely to be the sources of real trouble, and put a double line around them.

So I might want the chance for a potential reservation for specifically named "gases", like CN, which are named, registered, and justified as being already used domestically, and allow that their military use might be justified "in circumstances where it might be believed that (if ever) this would reduce casualties in the target group." This will doubtless leave room for argument, but it will be on a different issue than whether illegal chemical warfare was going on. However, the point is not worth holding on to if there is an international consensus for a workable arms-control scheme in CW generally. I don't see this as very likely soon if it must embrace all the marginal chemicals under a no-stockpile rule!

The No Gas rule is still difficult if we push it down the road. What do we call it if some guerillas are suffocated in a cave through CO generated by burning napalm? or just a brushfire? I wonder if that really is the most durable consensual line. I don't have very strong feelings one way or another, and the best course might be to follow the trend of international opinion. If we have a situation where all the countries are on the same footing, it does not matter too much where the line is drawn, provided of course that it sticks.

mutual I have wondered if there might not be some merit to CW as a level of deterrence a notch short of the thermonuclear, and therefore more credible that it would be invoked. But, the disadvantages of proliferation outweigh the likely merits. Also, I am convinced that US/NAFO strategy is committed to using "tactical nuclears" for this purpose, and that both sides do envisage something with more steps than the "No Atom" principle seems to imply. But this has its own dangers, and we might be better off if CW took the place of the tactical nuclears under an arms control agreement. That would make the "No Atom" principle much more credible.

but I don't see anything as complicated as this ever working out.