I did not have a chance yet to respond to the reprint from PHR, for which thank you. May I also ask of you a copy of your
paper in Pol Sci Q. 1975?
only a couple of small comments:
1) How well do you believe our leaders foresaw Hirohito's role in Japanese politics? How good was our intelligence about
internal Japanese politics? Was not HST and FDR captured by undiscriminating images of the "Japs" after Pearl Harbor,
kamikazes etc . . . ?
2) Perhaps you understate the autonomy and momentum of the field commands (vs. Washington) in the conduct of war. It would
have been very difficult for Truman
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to fine tune the air actions against Japan on a time scale of days. He must have been greatly relieved at being able to retain
control of the nuclear deployments!
Have you thought much about "Unconditional Surrender" in Europe. I was most uneasy (at age 18) about Casablanca, the
Morgenthau plan, etc. as they happened, and have, I believe, read all of the major works from Kecskemeti on. None of the apologies
for UC policy appear very satisfactory to me either as normative or descriptive accounts. Soviet interest and activity in
influencing our policy in particular
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has hardly been looked at. (Kim Philby did drop a cryptic line about disinformation concerning the anti-Hitler resistance
Have you thought of taking this on? Or do you point to an existing work that satisfies you -- if so what?