touched on many issues of longstanding (if avocational) interest to me, and I thank you for it!
I was startled enough at the remarks noted on p. 108 (attach) that I made some further enquiries. Telford Taylor, in "Munich"
takes a more comprehending posture; but is not willing to be so critical. Slesor's [sic] memoirs are self-critical, but
still have plenty of objective grounds for fear of the Luftwaffe. And you may be interested in Col. Levy's (professional)
assessment -- which should be coupled with many accounts of Britain's lack of preparation for defense against air attack,
so that unescorted heavy bombers could still do heavy damage
enc: Col Levy
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[BEGIN PAGE TWO]
So, while British leaders can be faulted for their half-hearted commitment to rearmament 1938-1939 (though how can a U.S.
national throw stones on this issue!), I suggest you reexamine the lack of "critical analysis." (One hopes the sheer
volume of strategic-analytic effort today can augment our clarity of policy judgment in like proportion!)