Your March 22 testimony was very well stated. Thank you for sending it.
I think there is much to be said on behalf of bombs in preference to shells in view of the deployment/release procedures of
My reflexes are for very great restraint; I have to stack this up against the possibility that we will be caught pants-down
against an adversary who is tempted to show no restraint whatsoever. How "idealistic" will our "restraint"
appear from that retrospective?
However I certainly will be armed with your critical questions in my own further queries.
What analysis do you have of collateral damage beyond your Sei Hun paper?
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More urgently than ever, I feel the need is to find some way to reestablish mutual trust with the USSR on A/C verification
issues. The charade of the "UN investigation" of 'yellow rain' was a serious step backward.
Can you suggest any positive steps? (I don't believe giving them the benefit of every conceivable doubt is in that category.
It just reinforces their stonewalling paradigm. -- Our own Secy. isn't always that helpful either!)
Is it really to the USSR's advantage to see us escalate CW? (Or do they believe that they will always have the freedom
of initiative for just use in a direct confrontation?)
No part of what's happening is giving joy to either of us!